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I. Introduction
The high seas, or oceanic areas beyond the exclusive economic
zones that surround territorial waters, together with the seabed
beyond the continental shelf, are known as areas beyond national
jurisdiction (“ABNJ”). 1 Aside from being one of the earliest
† J.D. Candidate 2021, University of North Carolina School of Law. Publication Editor,
North Carolina Journal of International Law.
1 Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, Marine Biodiversity Conservation: The International
Legal Framework and Challenges, 40 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 845, 849 (2018) (noting that
despite the slight difference between the terms “area beyond national jurisdiction” and
“high seas,” the terms are used interchangeably); see SIMONE BORG, CONSERVATION ON
THE HIGH SEAS: HARMONIZING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR THE SUSTAINABLE USE OF
LIVING RESOURCES 4 (2012); see also U.N., THE CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF
MARINE BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY OF AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION: A
TECHNICAL ABSTRACT OF THE FIRST GLOBAL INTEGRATED MARINE ASSESSMENT (2017),
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catalysts for international law, 2 these zones have suffered from a
lack of regulation that threatens the marine biodiversity in ABNJ. 3
Biological diversity, or biodiversity, is the variety in species of
animals, plants, microorganisms, and all living things in an
ecosystem, and is essential for an ecosystem’s development and
survival. 4 Biodiversity contributes to the preservation of ocean
ecosystems by helping disperse harm across many species and
minimize the risk of catastrophic loss, a process called the portfolio
effect. 5 Accordingly, ecosystems that have lost biodiversity can be
less resilient to climate change. 6 The Intergovernmental SciencePolicy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services’
(“IPBES”) 2019 report found that sixty-six percent of the ocean is
experiencing increasing cumulative impacts from human activity. 7
IPBES also found that this unprecedented rapid global change is
expected to continue beyond 2050. 8 This could be detrimental to
the 680 million people in coastal zones who depend on a functioning

https://www.un.org/depts/los/global_reporting/8th_adhoc_2017/Technical_Abstract_on_
the_Conservation_and_Sustainable_Use_of_marine_Biological_Diversity_of_Areas_Be
yond_National_Jurisdiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/34K8-T587] (“The areas beyond
national jurisdiction are estimated to cover about 60 per cent of the Earth’s surface.”).
2 See RAM PRAKASH ANAND, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA:
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW REVISITED 2–6 (1983).
3 Qureshi, supra note 1, at 912; see Margaret A. Young & Andrew Friedman,
Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction: Regimes and Their Interaction, 112 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. 123, 126 (2018).
4 Qureshi, supra note 1, at 849–51.
5 L.K. Ward, Nature’s Secret Weapon Against Climate Change, SMITHSONIAN (May
2016), https://ocean.si.edu/conservation/climate-change/natures-secret-weapon-againstclimate-change [https://perma.cc/8LEF-8LGQ].
6 PEW ENV’T GRP., POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: CONSERVING MARINE
BIODIVERSITY: ADDRESSING EXISTING COMMITMENTS AND DESIGNING NEXT STEPS FOR
ACTION (2013), https://www.un.org/Depts/los/biodiversityworkinggroup/documents/
Marine%20Biodiversity%20Conservation_Pew.pdf [https://perma.cc/PCA4-XWKS].
7 Intergovernmental Sci.-Pol’y Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Servs.
[IPBES], Rep. on the Work of Its Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. IPBES/7/10/Add.1, ¶ A4
(2019) [hereinafter IPBES].
8 See id. ¶ C4 (noting trends are expected to continue beyond 2050, due to projected
impacts of increasing sea-use, and exploitation of organisms and climate change).
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ocean system 9 that is already under stress due to climate change. 10
Likewise, environmental change is already negatively affecting
the distribution and abundance of marine life across the ocean and
the sea floor. 11 The ocean has absorbed over ninety percent of the
excess heat in the climate system, with warmer ocean surface
temperatures causing reduced mixing between water layers and thus
limiting the distribution of oxygen and nutrients for marine life. 12
Moreover, the ocean has absorbed between twenty and thirty
percent of the carbon dioxide humans have emitted since the
1980s. 13 Excess carbon dioxide leads to ocean acidification, which
negatively impacts the ability of some organisms, including
shellfish, coral, and calcareous plankton to maintain their shells,
threatening ecosystems and fishing industries worldwide. 14
Similarly, fish populations have shifted away from tropical oceans
in response to ocean warming and acidification. 15 While there could
be increases in catch potential in the Arctic, established fisheries in
tropical oceans will see decreases significant enough to reduce the
global catch potential. 16
In addition to cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, significant
policy changes are needed to minimize the depletion of fisheries and
give coastal communities the opportunity to adapt. 17 Human
activities such as overfishing, fishing by bottom trawling, and deepsea mining are exacerbating the reduction of marine biodiversity. 18
Overfishing, most common in international waters where

9 Press Release, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Choices Made
Now are Critical for the Future of Our Ocean and Cryosphere 1 (Sept. 25, 2019),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/3/2019/09/SROCC_PressRelease_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MYL4-DAHS] [hereinafter IPCC].
10 Id. at 1–3.
11 Id. at 3.
12 See id.
13 Id.
14 What is Ocean Acidification?, PAC. MARINE ENVTL. LAB. [PMEL] CARBON
PROGRAM, https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/co2/story/What+is+Ocean+Acidification%3F#:~
:text=The%20Chemistry,or%20%22OA%22%20for%20short
[https://perma.cc/7DYN-BHL6] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
15 IPCC, supra note 9, at 3.
16 See id.
17 See id. at 4.
18 Qureshi, supra note 1, at 852–54.
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monitoring is limited, threatens marine life with extinction. 19
Irresponsible fishing practices threaten more than common food
species as practices such as bottom trawling, used widely since the
1980s, can entrap species like turtles or crush seafloor species and
coral reefs. 20 For example, bottom trawling destroys nearly 900,000
pounds of coral reef each year along the Alaskan coast, damaging
entire ecosystems in the process. 21 Deep-sea mining also destroys
ocean habitats, which often means death for marine animals unable
to find a new habitat in the vast ocean. 22
Common destructive practices can become especially
concerning in the high seas. “Straddling fish stocks” present a clear
example, defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (“UNCLOS”) in article sixty-three, clause two, as “the same
stock or stocks of associated species [which] occur both within the
exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the
zone.” 23 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (“FAO”) has estimated that straddling fish stocks were
overfished at a rate of sixty-four percent, twice that of stocks within
states’ jurisdictions, and sixty-seven percent of the forty-eight
observed migratory fish stocks, particularly tuna, were overfished
or depleted. 24 In addition, forty-six percent of migratory sharks
were threatened and twenty-one percent were near threatened,
contrasted with the fourteen percent of non-migratory sharks that
were threatened. 25 While there is some specific governance over
ABNJ, it has largely failed at its objectives. 26 For example, twothirds of fish stocks under the management of regional fishery
management organizations (“RFMOs”) are depleted or

Id. at 853.
Id. at 852.
21 See id. at 852–53.
22 See id. at 854.
23 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], art. 63, ¶ 2, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16,
1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
24 PREDICTING FUTURE OCEANS: SUSTAINABILITY OF OCEAN AND HUMAN SYSTEMS
AMIDST GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 429 (William Cheung et al. eds., 2019)
[hereinafter PREDICTING FUTURE OCEANS].
25 Id.
26 See Cassandra Brooks et al., Challenging the ‘Right to Fish’ in a Fast-Changing
Ocean, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 289, 297 (2014).
19
20
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overfished. 27 These gaps illustrate the danger of the underregulated
activity that is ongoing in ABNJ.
The IPBES has identified a legally binding instrument as
essential to improving sustainability, having also stated that
protecting and managing ocean resources requires monitoring and
managing biodiversity-rich seas beyond currently protected areas. 28
Coming to terms with the situation in our oceans, 29 the link between
ocean processes and climate change, and how a healthy ocean
system is critical for mitigating climate change, 30 the United
Nations convened a conference to design a treaty to address modern
issues in ABNJ. This Intergovernmental Conference on an
International Legally Binding Instrument Under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction (“BBNJ Conference”) already met in
September 2018, March-April 2019, and August 2019. 31 Looking
ahead to the fourth and final round of negotiations, the remaining
issues to be addressed can be categorized into four groups: (1)
ownership over marine genetic resources (“MGRs”), including
benefits sharing, (2) management of area-based tools, including
marine protected areas, (3) form of environmental impact
assessments (“EIAs”), and (4) participation in capacity-building
and the transfer of marine technology to developing countries. 32 By
holding the BBNJ Conference, the United Nations demonstrates a
desire to use international law for the conservation and sustainable
Id.
See IPBES, supra note 7, at 31–32, ¶¶ 34, 37.
29 Negotiating Legally-Binding Agreement to Provide Future Generations with a
‘Healthy, Resilient and Productive Ocean’, UN NEWS (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/08/1044571
[https://perma.cc/ED2R-UH9X]
[hereinafter Negotiating].
30 Id.
31 Distinguish “ABNJ,” areas beyond national jurisdiction, from the more specific
“BBNJ,” the biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. In other words, BBNJ is found
within ABNJ. Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction, U.N., https://www.un.org/bbnj/ [https://perma.cc/P9CW-K9J2]
(last visited Dec. 8, 2020) [hereinafter Intergovernmental Conference].
32 See Intergovernmental Conference on an Internationally Legally Binding
Instrument Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction,
Statement by the President of the Conference at the Closing of the Third Session, 2, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.232/2019/10 (Sept. 13, 2019) [hereinafter President Statement].
27
28
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use of ocean resources. 33 The remainder of this article will examine
the history of the UNCLOS, the state of the BBNJ Conference, and
the main sources of contention to be negotiated in the final session.
II. Legal Framework
A. Law of the Sea and Its Failure
Management of ABNJ is currently under the umbrella of the
UNCLOS, 34 which describes ABNJ as property of humanity, so
that no single nation can claim ownership of these areas or their
resources. 35 Coming into force in 1994, the UNCLOS’ provisions
for the conservation of biological diversity impose only a general
obligation on nations to adequately preserve the marine
ecosystem. 36 Part XII of the UNCLOS, 37 along with RFMOs,
encompass the existing legal foundation for protecting marine
biodiversity. 38 In addition, the United Nations Fish Stocks
Agreement (“UNFSA”), 39 which applies to migratory fish stocks
and high seas fish stocks, came into force under the UNCLOS in
2001. 40 The UNFSA emphasizes the obligation to protect marine
biodiversity by advising coastal states to cooperate and practice
sustainable management of fish stocks. 41 However, the UNFSA
falls short of its international goals, as only 87 states have
recognized the agreement. 42 Other treaties only address specific
marine sectors such as shipping, fishing in the South East Atlantic,
G.A. Res. 66/288, ¶ 158 (Sept. 11, 2012).
UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 86.
35 Qureshi, supra note 1, at 886.
36 Id. at 855 (“The UNCLOS was ratified in 1994 and provides certain provisions for
the conservation of the marine ecosystem and biological diversity. Part XII of the
UNCLOS relates to the conservation of the marine ecosystem. It imposes a general
obligation on all nations to take adequate measures to preserve the marine ecosystem and
biodiversity.”).
37 UNCLOS, supra note 23, pt XII.
38 Qureshi, supra note 1, at 886.
39 U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37
(Sept. 8, 1995).
40 Qureshi, supra note 1, at 862.
41 Id. at 862–63.
42 Id. at 864.
33
34
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or whaling. 43
The UNCLOS addresses a wide range of marine issues, but falls
short of protecting biological diversity in ABNJ. Part XII of the
UNCLOS compels nations to protect the marine environment and
take measures to prevent pollution. 44 Here, the UNCLOS extends
the duty to prevent pollution to limit waste that would harm
endangered species and their habitats, but without explicitly
mentioning biodiversity. 45 To address the impacts of shipping on
marine species and pollution from oil spills, the UNCLOS merely
recommends that nations obey the International Maritime
Organization. 46 To address overfishing, Part VII(2) of the
UNCLOS grants all states the right to utilize ABNJ for fishing, but
makes this freedom conditional on sustainable uses. 47 While the
UNCLOS does not have its own internal body to govern this
potentially unlimited freedom to fish in ABNJ, Article 118 suggests
that coastal states form independent RFMOs to facilitate
cooperation towards achieving conservation goals. 48 To address the
dumping of pollutants into the ocean, Articles 210 and 216 merely
oblige coastal states to enact domestic laws to prevent dumping in
both their exclusive economic zones and in ABNJ. 49 The UNCLOS
perhaps pays the most attention to deep-sea mining, in that it
established the International Seabed Authority to regulate deep-sea
mining in ABNJ.50
While the UNCLOS creates plenty of commitments for nations
to protect marine environments, 51 it leaves oversight and
enforcement in ABNJ to a wide array of agreements and
intergovernmental organizations. 52 As a result, the greatest current
threats to marine ecosystems in ABNJ—shipping, fishing, and
seabed mining—are regulated by a collection of sectoral

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

See Young & Friedman, supra note 3, at 123.
Qureshi, supra note 1, at 855.
Id. at 855–56.
Id. at 858–89.
Id. at 859.
Id.
Id. at 859–60.
Qureshi, supra note 1, at 860–61.
See id. at 886–87.
See Young & Friedman, supra note 3, at 123–24.
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organizations and RFMOs. 53 These organizations are assisted by
international groups aimed at protecting regional ecosystems, like
the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, and others concerned with specific species such as the
International Whaling Commission and the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species. 54 Additionally, the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) can exercise authority over
some commerce in ABNJ. 55 The confusion from these overlapping
bodies is compounded by the difficulty in monitoring ships,
vessels, 56 and fish stocks, and has led to unmonitored exploitation
in large sections of the ocean. 57 As evidenced by the resulting lack
of enforcement, the UNCLOS provisions for the conservation of the
marine ecosystem only provide goals for nations to prioritize the
preservation of marine biodiversity and develop international
cooperation. 58 The gap between the goals of the UNCLOS and
successful implementation highlights the needs for a new
convention focused on ABNJ.
B. Adding a New Convention
The United Nations convened an intergovernmental BBNJ
Conference to add to the UNCLOS an international legally binding
instrument to expand biodiversity protections, thus focusing on the
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in
areas beyond national jurisdiction (“BBNJ”). 59 The new instrument
will likely create additional obligations on top of those created by
the UNCLOS, thereby strengthening existing BBNJ protections. 60
For example, a new area-based management tool created under this
new instrument could overlap with an existing RFMO and
consequently limit a nation from fishing in an area where it

Id. at 124.
54 Id.
55 See Id.
56 Qureshi, supra note 1, at 911–12.
57 PREDICTING FUTURE OCEANS, supra note 24, at 429; see Young & Friedman,
supra note 3, at 123–24.
58 See Qureshi, supra note 1, at 855 (referencing Part XII of the UNCLOS).
59 Distinguish “ABNJ,” areas beyond national jurisdiction, from the more specific
“BBNJ,” the biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. In other words, BBNJ is found
within ABNJ. G.A. Res. 72/249, ¶ 1 (Jan. 19, 2018).
60 Young & Friedman, supra note 3, at 125.
53
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previously had autonomy as a member and operator of the RFMO. 61
The new instrument could also supersede rules created by current
regulatory arms of the UNCLOS. 62
In 2015, the United Nations capped off a 15-year negotiation
process 63 by deciding to create a new legal instrument under the
UNCLOS, specifically designed to conserve and protect sustainable
uses of BBNJ. 64 That process began with a Preparatory Committee,
established by the U.N. General Assembly and open to participation
and recommendations from all state members of the United Nations,
parties to the UNCLOS, and others as observers. 65 In 2017, the
United Nations decided to convene the BBNJ Conference, open to
all state members, organizations that are parties to the UNCLOS,
and a widely inclusive category of observers, to consider the
Preparatory Committee’s recommendations and draft an instrument
for the conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ, with the objective
to develop the instrument as soon as possible. 66 The BBNJ
Conference met in September 2018, March 2019, and August 2019,
and was slated to reach a final agreement in the first half of 2020. 67
While the final session has been delayed due to COVID-19, 68
Id.
Id.
63 Rachel Tiller et al., The Once and Future Treaty: Towards a New Regime for
Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 99 MARINE POL’Y 239, 242 (2019).
64 G.A. Res. 69/282, Development of an International Legally Binding Instrument
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction
(July 6, 2015); see also Intergovernmental Conference, supra note 31.
65 G.A. Res. 69/282, supra note 64, ¶ 1(a); David Leary, Agreeing to Disagree on
What We Have or Have Not Agreed On: The Current State of Play of the BBNJ
Negotiations on the Status of Marine Genetic Resources in Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction, 99 MARINE POL’Y 21, 24 (2019).
66 G.A. Res. 72/249, supra note 59, ¶¶ 8–12; see Intergovernmental Conference,
supra note 31; Leary, supra note 65.
67 Intergovernmental Conference, supra note 31; see Negotiating, supra note 29;
Rep. of the Preparatory Comm. Established by G.A. Res. 69/292: Development of an
International Legally Binding Instrument Under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity
of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.287/2017/PC.4/2 (July 31,
2017) [hereinafter Preparatory Committee Report].
68 The President of the General Assembly, Letter dated Mar. 9, 2020 from the
President of the General Assembly to All Permanent Representatives and Permanent
Observers to the U.N. (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.un.org/bbnj/sites/www.un.org.bbnj/
files/bbnj-letter-from-president-of-the-bbnj-conference.pdf
[https://perma.cc/42DZ61
62
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delegates are hopeful that the ongoing BBNJ Conference will
continue a coordinated effort to help sustain and conserve marine
species. 69 The participating delegations persist and remain acutely
aware of the urgent need for an ambitious yet practical treaty. 70
C. The BBNJ Conference
After the most recent session in August 2019, and in preparation
for the final meeting, the BBNJ Conference demonstrated its
progress by focusing discussions around a preliminary “zero
draft.” 71 This draft outlines the future treaty and includes working
definitions and optional wording of articles that still require
discussion. 72 The suggested text in the draft proposed an objective
for the final agreement to “ensure the long-term conservation and
sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond
national jurisdiction through effective implementation of the
relevant provisions of the Convention and further international
cooperation and coordination.” 73 At this point in the negotiations,
most delegations have agreed upon the importance of facilitating the
participation of developing countries, promoting conservation of
BBNJ, using BBNJ only for peaceful purposes, and emphasizing a
precautionary approach to scientific decision making. 74 It is also
confirmed that this treaty will respect the existing rights of coastal
YWDA] [hereinafter Letter from the President of the General Assembly].
69 Negotiating, supra note 29.
70 Press Release, General Assembly, New Oceans Treaty Must Be Robust, Practical
in Application, Delegates Stress, Closing Third Round of Marine Biodiversity
Negotiations, U.N. Press Release SEA/2118 (Aug. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Press Release
SEA/2118]; see President of the Intergovernmental Conference, Letter dated Sept. 10,
2020 from the President of the Intergovernmental Conference to Permanent
Representatives of Member States to the United Nations, Members of the specialized
agencies,
and
Parties
to
the
UNCLOS
(Sept.
10,
2020),
https://www.un.org/bbnj/sites/www.un.org.bbnj/files/intersessional_work__bbnj_president_letter_to_delegations.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE7S-Z9ZK].
71 Id.; see Intergovernmental Conference on an Internationally Legally Binding
Instrument Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction,
Draft Text of an Agreement Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction, Introduction ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.232/2019/6 (May 17, 2019)
[hereinafter Draft].
72 Id.
73 Id. art. 2.
74 Id. art. 9.
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nations over the areas under their national jurisdictions. 75
Moreover, the BBNJ instrument will coexist with customary
international law and therefore apply to states regardless of their
treaty commitments. 76
Consolidation of ideas into the zero draft illustrates the key
facets of the future BBNJ convention that will need to be negotiated
in the final session. 77 Most of the remaining disagreements revolve
around the four thematic issues coming out of the third session that
will likely also dominate debate in the final session of the BBNJ
Conference. 78 These four issues are: (1) ownership over marine
genetic resources, including benefits sharing, (2) management of
area-based tools, including marine protected areas, (3) form of
environmental impact assessments, and (4) participation in
capacity-building and the transfer of marine technology to
developing countries. 79
III. Practical Topics of Debate
A. Marine Genetic Resources and Benefits Sharing
The potential value of MGRs combined with minimal oversight
of ABNJ has created an imbalance between nations over the benefits
obtained from MGRs and has made MGRs a central issue at the
BBNJ Conference. 80 Existing U.N. objectives for MGRs have been
to avoid their overexploitation and to help developing countries
access and use the MGRs found in ABNJ. 81 The Preparatory
Committee reiterated these objectives, while also emphasizing
protection of biodiversity. 82 Remaining issues regarding MGRs
include the scope of benefit sharing, who can regulate access,
whether to address intellectual property rights, and the creation of a
solid definition for MGRs. 83

22.

75

Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 67, at 8; see Leary, supra note 65, at

Young & Friedman, supra note 3, at 126.
See Draft, supra note 71.
78 Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 67, at 7–10.
79 President Statement, supra note 32, at 2.
80 See id. at 2, 5–8; Press Release SEA/2118, supra note 70.
81 Draft, supra note 71; see Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 67, at 10;
Qureshi, supra note 1, at 849.
82 Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 67, at 10.
83 Id. at 17.
76
77
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While the UNCLOS currently oversees management of ABNJ, 84
the UNCLOS does not define MGRs. 85 The Convention on
Biological Diversity offered early guidance 86 that has been updated
in the BBNJ Conference’s zero draft. 87 The zero draft, still up for
debate in the final session, contains two working definitions for
MGRs: either the specific “any material of marine plant, animal,
microbial or other origin, [found in or] originating from areas
beyond national jurisdiction and containing functional units of
heredity with actual or potential value of their genetic and
biochemical properties,” or the simple “marine genetic material of
actual or potential value.” 88 This second definition would require
further explanation of what constitutes marine genetic material.
However, the working definition for marine genetic material has not
been settled, and here the two debated clauses are signaled by
brackets: “any material of marine plant, animal, microbial or other
origin containing functional units of heredity [collected from areas
beyond national jurisdiction] [; it does not include material made
from material, such as derivatives, or information describing
material, such as genetic sequence data].” 89 The first optional
clause, “collected from areas beyond national jurisdiction,”
highlights uncertainty over whether this instrument’s scope will be
limited to the MGRs found in ABNJ. It also reflects the assertion of
some coastal states to claim sole ownership of the MGRs that can
still be found within their coastal jurisdiction. 90 The second
optional clause emphasizes that DNA’s actual or potential value is
the most important facet of MGRs, and its inclusion could preserve
the possibility for limited benefits sharing. 91
Many MGRs reside in ABNJ. 92 Advanced oceanographic
technology has allowed scientists to explore the most remote areas
Qureshi, supra note 1, at 849.
Kirsten E. Zewers, Bright Future for Marine Genetic Resources, Bleak Future for
Settlement of Ownership Rights: Reflections on the United Nations Law of the Sea
Consultative Process on Marine Genetic Resources, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 151, 153
(2008).
86 Convention on Biological Diversity art. 2, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
87 Draft, supra note 71, at 5.
88 Bracketed text signals undecided language. Id.
89 Bracketed text signals undecided language. Id.
90 Id.
91 Zewers, supra note 85, at 154.
92 See id. at 151; see also Draft, supra note 71.
84
85
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and discover that the unique genetics of organisms found living
deep in the oceans, specifically around hydrothermal vents, 93 have
expected uses for scientific research, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics,
and industrial processes. These uses range from potential biofuel to
an anticancer agent. 94 This “bio-prospecting” for MGRs is an
emerging activity in ABNJ with the prospect of major profits. 95
However, while the potential value is clear, the significant cost of
exploring the ocean floor has only allowed developed countries to
take advantage of these resources that lie beyond any national
jurisdictions. 96 For example, patents have been filed for MGRs
derived from over 800 marine species, many found in ABNJ around
hydrothermal vents, yet these patents were filed by entities from
only 30 countries. 97
Even though the exact value of MGRs in ABNJ is thus far
undetermined, the value of products derived from MGRs found
within national jurisdictions have created enough optimism to spur
debate among delegates at the BBNJ Conference over benefit
sharing. 98 Developed states want to avoid excessive burdens that
might deter industry investment. 99 Alternatively, developing states,
often with especially high expectations of the wealth that will come
from MGRs, 100 argue that open-access to resources and a weak
benefit sharing regime would result in profits going entirely to
corporations from developed nations, thus disregarding the
UNCLOS classification of resources in ABNJ as property of
humanity. 101
The debate over what benefits from MGRs will be shared again
Zewers, supra note 85, at 154–55.
Id. at 153–155; see also DEEP-OCEAN STEWARDSHIP INITIATIVE, POLICY BRIEF
MARCH 2019: THE FULL VALUE OF MARINE GENETIC RESOURCES (MGR), 2 (2019),
http://dosi-project.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Full-value-mgr-March2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H9AH-RAVL].
95 Tiller et al., supra note 63, at 241.
96 Zewers, supra note 85, at 151 (“Unfortunately, due to the high cost of
oceanographic excavation, estimated at one billion dollars per episode, developed
countries have held a monopoly on such excavation technologies and the MGRs collected
there from.”).
97 PREDICTING FUTURE OCEANS, supra note 24, at 362.
98 Tiller et al., supra note 63, at 241.
99 Id.
100 Leary, supra note 65, at 27.
101 Tiller et al., supra note 63, at 241.
93
94
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pits developing nations against developed nations. 102 The Group of
77 (a coalition of more than 130 developing countries) 103 and China
have argued that both monetary and non-monetary benefits should
be shared as future profits are sufficiently guaranteed. 104 The
European Union, Australia, and other delegations contend that
MGRs possess only potential monetary value because costly
research can take ten to fifteen years and in most cases will not result
in a useful product. 105 Consequently, this group only supports the
sharing of non-monetary benefits, such as access to resources, data,
and marine scientific research, and argues that these non-monetary
benefits more accurately reflect the potential value of MGRs and
the risky research process their development requires. 106
MGRs are an emerging issue in international ocean governance
and have exposed a gap left by the UNCLOS. 107 Regulation of
MGRs will be a key component of a future comprehensive ocean
governance regime and integral to protecting biodiversity. 108
B. Area-Based Management Tools, Including Marine
Protected Areas
The United Nations has reaffirmed a need for area-based
conservation measures and has restated that ten percent of coastal
and marine areas, especially those of particular importance for
biodiversity, should be protected. 109 Currently, the only groups to
implement area-based management tools in ABNJ are the sectoral
organizations: RFMOs, the International Seabed Authority, and the
International Maritime Organization. 110 These groups have only
employed seasonal or partial closures in ABNJ to protect vulnerable
ecosystems or spawning areas. 111 The limited restrictions, and the

Id.
Brian Duignan et al., Group of 77, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Group-of-77 [https://perma.cc/99NK-VD32] (last
updated Oct. 29, 2013).
104 Tiller et al., supra note 63, at 241.
105 Leary, supra note 65, at 27.
106 Id.
107 Tiller et al., supra note 63, at 239.
108 Id.; see Negotiating, supra note 29.
109 G.A. Res. 66/288, supra note 33, ¶ 177.
110 Tiller et al., supra note 63, at 240.
111 Id.
102
103

2021 PROTECTING BIODIVERSITY BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION

171

tendency of marine protected areas to be spatially and temporally
constrained, have made activists wary of relying on area-based tools
to build a network of protected zones. 112
The working definition out of the zero draft for an area-based
management tool, with undecided language signaled in brackets, is
“a tool for a geographically defined area, other than a marine
protected area, through which one or several sectors or activities are
managed with the aim of achieving particular conservation and
sustainable use objectives [and affording higher protection than that
provided in the surrounding areas].” 113 A marine protected area is
preliminarily defined as “a geographically defined marine area that
is designated and managed to achieve specific [long-term
biodiversity] conservation and sustainable use objectives [and that
affords higher protection than the surrounding areas]”. 114 The
recommendation from the Preparatory Committee suggests that
designating marine protected areas should include a review of the
best available scientific information, standards, and criteria,
including uniqueness, rarity, and fragility. 115
Currently, due to an absence of adequate monitoring processes,
existing marine protected areas in ABNJ are mismanaged and are
therefore ineffective. 116 For example, RFMOs, made up of
volunteer fishing entities—usually nations—that come together to
jointly manage a region, 117 have thus far been tasked by the
UNCLOS and the UNFSA with adopting legally binding
conservation measures for fish stocks moving between the high seas
and national jurisdictions; however, RFMOs have a mixed record in
dealing with ecosystem and climate changes. 118 The failure of
RFMOs is partially due to private industry lobbying, 119 and partly
due to their voluntary nature which forces regulations to remain lax
enough to ensure complete participation. 120 If even one major
fishing entity refused to participate in the RFMO, the entire
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Id.
Bracketed text signals undecided language. Draft, supra note 71, annex.
Bracketed text signals undecided language. Id.
Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 67, at 11.
Qureshi, supra note 1, at 849.
PREDICTING FUTURE OCEANS, supra note 24, at 475–76.
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Id. at 381.
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structure would fail; therefore, enforcement is almost completely
toothless. 121 Discussions at the past BBNJ Conference sessions
have recognized that the supposedly science-based decisions about
opening and closing area-based management tools can be
politicized, but a solution has not been proposed. 122
In turn, the BBNJ Conference will need to determine a more
appropriate institutional and decision-making framework. 123 A
potential solution, supported by a few states, is to empower a global
organization to design and implement area-based management
tools, rather than placing responsibility entirely in local hands. 124
Alternatively, a hybrid approach would have regional bodies, such
as existing RFMOs, report to a global authority under the BBNJ
instrument, which would standardize best practices and propose
new sites for protection. 125
C. Environmental Impact Assessments
The Preparatory Committee suggested that EIAs should draw
from the existing regime in the UNCLOS and oblige states to
“assess the potential effects of planned activities under their
jurisdiction or control in areas beyond national jurisdiction.” 126 But
the Preparatory Committee also noted a need to expand the existing
framework and outline procedural steps, including screening,
scoping, public notification, and the publication of reports. 127
Delegations at the BBNJ Conference have generally agreed that
EIAs are meant to make information publicly available, but have
not finalized when an EIA is required and what an EIA should
address within its scope. 128 In previous meetings, the European
121 Id. (“No international fisheries management organization could be effective if
significant portions of the fishing and market existed outside of its structure, and
encouraging buy-in of all stakeholders is, therefore, paramount.”).
122 Tiller et al., supra note 63, at 240.
123 Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 67, at 17.
124 Tiller et al., supra note 63, at 240.
125 Id.
126 Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 67, at 13.
127 Id.
128 See Press Release, Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity,
Delegates Discuss Guidelines for Content of Environmental Impact Assessment Reports,
as Negotiations on New High Seas Treaty Enter Second Week, U.N. Press Release
SEA/2117 (Aug. 29, 2019); see also Tiller et al., supra note 63, at 240 (“Parties at the
negotiations struggled to define [EIA terms] during the negotiations, and there was no
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Union called for a convention that outlines the basic content of an
EIA. Meanwhile, the Group of 77, the Group of Like-Minded Latin
American States, Australia, and Switzerland suggested limiting the
scope of EIAs, and delegations representing the African Group and
the Caribbean Community called for EIAs to address both the
environmental and the social impacts of planned activity. 129
Furthermore, states have generally agreed that the state
undertaking the activity should be responsible for the EIA, but there
is no consensus on what should be done with completed EIAs. 130
Some states, mostly developing countries, suggested establishing a
globally associated scientific committee to review EIAs. 131
However, this proposal received pushback from developed states,
especially Russia, arguing that such a system would undermine trust
in EIA-drafting scientists. 132 Debate also emerged regarding the
definition and purpose of Strategic Environmental Assessments,
which were described as an EIA with a greater focus on future
concerns. 133 Whether or not Strategic Environmental Assessments
are utilized, most states have agreed that, with the redaction of
intellectual property and other sensitive information, public access
to EIAs is vital and a publishing mechanism will need to be
developed. 134
The zero draft contains suggestions for a number of thresholds
for an EIA, including a belief that planned activities will cause
substantial pollution, significant and harmful changes, or, in other
words, “more than a minor or transitory effect on the marine
environment.” 135 Fundamental questions remaining in the zero
draft, such as EIAs’ thresholds and the impacts they must assess,
will need to be answered in the final session of the BBNJ
Conference.

obvious consensus.”).
129 Id.
130 Tiller et al., supra note 63, at 240–41.
131 Id. at 241.
132 Id.
133 Id. (“There was some argument over what exactly SEAs were and how it related
to an EIA where some delegates argued that it was a type of EIA, but one that included
future prospects as well.”); see also Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 67, at 17.
134 Tiller et al., supra note 63, at 241.
135 Draft, supra note 71, at 22.
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D. Capacity-Building and the Transfer of Marine Technology
Part XIV of the UNCLOS encourages states to help develop the
marine scientific and technological capacity of developing states. 136
According to the zero draft’s working definition for marine
technology, the materials developing states might require could
include, among other things, standards and reference materials on
marine sciences, computer software and modeling techniques, and
even ocean observation facilities, such as remote sensing
equipment, buoys, and tide gauges. 137 Article 271 of the UNCLOS
called for the establishment of guidelines for transfers of marine
technology, which were eventually laid out by the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission in 2003. 138 These
guidelines promote fair conditions for transfers and methods where
all parties can benefit, but these guidelines are a non-binding tool. 139
Nonetheless, the BBNJ Conference aims to solidify a definition and
provide an effective institutional mechanism for transfers of marine
technology. 140
Broad categories for capacity-building suggested by the
Preparatory Committee include scientific and technical assistance,
education and training of human resources, and data and specialized
knowledge. 141 This recommendation was applied to the zero draft,
which broadly defines transfer of marine technology as “the transfer
of the instruments, equipment, vessels, processes and
methodologies required to produce and use knowledge to improve
the study and understanding of the nature and resources of the
ocean.” 142
The main point of contention in this area has been whether
transfers and capacity-building will be mandatory or voluntary, and

UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 266.
Draft, supra note 71, at 5.
138 UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 271.
See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL
OCEANOGRAPHIC COMMISSION [IOC], IOC CRITERIA AND GUIDELINES ON THE TRANSFER OF
MARINE TECHNOLOGY (CGTMT) (2005).
139 Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission: Resources, Meetings,
Documents, People, U.N. EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. [UNESCO], http://www.iocunesco.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=316&Itemid=100028
[https://perma.cc/3DAC-K9MN] (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
140 See Tiller et al., supra note 63.
141 Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 67, at 14.
142 Draft, supra note 71, at 5–6.
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whether money should be directly involved. 143 Some delegates at
previous BBNJ Conference sessions voiced concerns that voluntary
funding would be insufficient, with the Group of 77 insisting on the
inclusion of the word “mandatory” to increase legal obligations. 144
Others, such as the United States, have argued the UNCLOS
sufficiently covers capacity-building and technology transfers in
Part XIV and that a new instrument should not duplicate those
results. 145 Similarly, the European Union explained that a needsdriven approach to capacity-building will help prevent overlap with
existing country-driven programs. 146 Representatives from the
Group of Like-Minded Latin American States and the Group of 77
countered that language on avoiding duplication could lead to actors
carving out their own niches in the preexisting capacity-building
process and crowding out newer, more efficient deliverers of marine
technology. 147 Finally, many developed nations contested the
inclusion of language that details specific types of capacity-building
and technology-transfer benefits, with the European Union
specifically speaking out against the inclusion of MGRs in this
section of the instrument. 148
Future negotiations on capacity-building will likely continue to
focus on the terms and conditions for the transfer of marine
technology, as well as elaboration on how a needs-driven
mechanism would work. 149
E. Ideological Debate: Common Heritage of Mankind vs.
Freedom of the High Seas
Furthermore, before a new ocean governance regime can be
143 Press Release, Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity, Delegates
Consider Role of Capacity-Building, Technology Transfer, as Deliberations Continue on
Treaty Governing Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdictions, U.N. Press Release
SEA/2110 (Aug. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Press Release SEA/2110]; see Tiller et al., supra
note 63, at 420 (“The discussion during the negotiations centered not on this specifically,
but instead on whether or not these transfers and capacity building measures should be
mandatory or voluntary for states to participate in, and if there were to be money
involved.”).
144 Press Release SEA/2110, supra note 143.
145 Id; see also Tiller et al., supra note 63; UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 266.
146 Press Release SEA/2110, supra note 143; see UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 266.
147 Press Release SEA/2110, supra note 143.
148 Id.
149 See id; see also Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 67, at 17.
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established, the United Nations will need to make a decision
regarding the extremely contentious overarching principle that will
describe the biological resources found in ABNJ: 150 either the
common heritage of mankind, which governs seabed mining, or the
freedom of the high seas, which directs navigation, fishing, and
seafloor cables. 151
This longstanding debate has become
particularly provocative when discussing the potentially valuable
MGRs. 152 As the current UNCLOS references both the common
heritage of mankind and the freedom of the high seas, 153 the
principle the BBNJ instrument will adopt remains inconclusive.
The modern law of the sea can trace its origins to the 17th
century European powers’ expansion into markets in Asia and
Africa, vying for shares of the oceanic trade routes and promoting
the freedom of the high seas ethos. 154 In fact, a major foundational
work for the law of the sea was Hugo Grotius’ The Freedom of the
Seas, written to justify the breaking of the Portuguese trading
monopoly and the seizure of Portuguese ships by the Dutch East
India Company. 155 In 1602, Grotius wrote that public goods are the
common property of human society as a whole, and “ . . . the sea is
common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a
possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of all,
whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of
fisheries.” 156 These ideas, originally intended as an argument for
access to the ocean, were reinterpreted in the 18th and 19th centuries
to exclude territorial waters and developed into the modern concept
of freedom of the high seas that has been used to defend unilateral
exploitation of resources in ABNJ. 157 By the same token, Grotius’
assumption that the ocean was one of those things, “ . . . which can
be used without loss to anyone else . . . ” illustrates how his line of

Leary, supra note 65, at 23.
151 Id. at 23–25.
152 Id. at 24.
153 UNCLOS, supra note 23, arts. 57, 87.
154 RAM PRAKASH ANAND, supra note 2, at 6.
155 See James Brown Scott, Introduction to HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE
SEAS, at vi (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., New York: Oxford University Press 1916).
156 HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS: OR, THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO
THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 24 (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin
trans., Batoche Books 2000).
157 RAM PRAKASH ANAND, supra note 2, at 6.
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thinking may be outdated. 158
Article 87 of the UNCLOS gives states the freedom of
navigating, shipping, constructing cables, building artificial islands,
fishing, and conducting research in ABNJ as long as the activity
does not harm the interest of other states. 159 Furthermore, Article
88 conditions use of the high seas for only peaceful purposes and in
ways that will cause no harm to marine life or the environment. 160
While abundant food and mineral resources have been found in the
ocean, with new technology making it all increasingly exploitable,
the traditional ways of thinking about the uses of ABNJ and the
resources within have proven inadequate to counter the ecosystem
degradation that threatens future economic potential and
sustainability. 161 Now, as the international society has grown
beyond the traditional European powers, challenges to past
ideologies have fueled debate at the BBNJ Conference, particularly
as those, “[s]uppressed and neglected for a long time, the Asian and
African states, along with other equally ignored Latin American
states, have begun to plan an active and assertive role in the
development and formulation of a new maritime law.” 162 In
contention with the status quo, many states at the BBNJ Conference
have pushed for an explicit adoption of the common heritage of
mankind ideology, which emphasizes inclusive activities in ABNJ
that result in the sharing of all benefits. 163
Generally, at the BBNJ Conference the ideological debate
centers around developed states supporting the freedom of the high
seas and developing states arguing for the application of the
common heritage of mankind. 164 The Group of 77 and China view
the principle of common heritage of mankind, due to its wide
applicability, as a necessary part of an equitable regime of ocean
governance that will enforce commitments, such as sharing access
to and benefits of MGRs. 165 Critics of the application of the
Id.
159 Qureshi, supra note 1, at 887.
160 Id. at 887–88.
161 See RAM PRAKASH ANAND, supra note 2, at 6.
162 Id.
163 See Leary, supra note 65, at 23–25.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 24; see also .Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand to the U.N.,
Letter dated Dec. 5, 2016 from the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand to the
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common heritage of mankind here, particularly Iceland, believe that
although many MGRs, like mining interests, are found on the
seabed, common heritage should not extend to renewable biological
resources and is merely delaying negotiations of more relevant
matters. 166
Taking an intermediate approach to this difficult issue, the
European Union and Norway expressed an interest in abandoning
the ideological debate entirely and focusing on negotiations directly
involving benefit sharing for MGRs. 167 Some of the justifications
cited for dropping this debate are that reconciliation seems unlikely,
adopting the common heritage view is not necessary to achieve
desired goals, the elements of the common heritage of mankind
could be integrated into the international instrument without
formally adopting the ideology, and the ideological debate merely
delays practical actions to protect biodiversity in ABNJ. 168 More
explicitly, the common heritage of mankind usually involves three
themes: (1) non-appropriation of the deep seabed in ABNJ, (2)
common management of resources, and (3) benefits sharing. 169 All
of these themes have been discussed at the BBNJ Conference and,
referring to the position of many developed states, they can be
implemented in direct relation to the topics where they are relevant
without formally adopting the common heritage of mankind
ideology. 170 Another potential solution could be to follow the
example of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which after
debate over the common heritage of mankind instead chose to frame
biodiversity as the “common concern of mankind.” 171 Nevertheless,
the debate has continued to the point where Norway has expressed
concern that as, “[i]t appears to be difficult to reach agreement on
this issue . . . . [we] hope that this disagreement will not be allowed
to prevent states from utilizing this opportunity to establish a new

U.N. addressed to the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/69/292 (July 6, 2015), https://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/
prepcom_files/rolling_comp/Group_of_77_and_China.pdf
[https://perma.cc/38Q7GJUZ].
166 Leary, supra note 65, at 24.
167 Id.
168 Id.
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regime for MGRs in ABNJ, including the sharing of benefits.” 172
IV. Conclusion
The BBNJ negotiations represent an interest in filling the gaps
left by the UNCLOS and finalizing a comprehensive ocean
governance regime that expands to effectively govern BBNJ. 173
Whether existing gaps were due to incomplete definitions in the
UNCLOS, new issues such as MGRs, or a worsened climate
situation, the United Nations is conclusive in its desire to complete
the regime. 174
Key facets of the BBNJ convention will need to be negotiated
in the BBNJ Conference’s final session, which has been rescheduled
from March 2020 to the earliest possible date following the COVID19 outbreak. 175 It is already well-decided that existing rights of
coastal states over the areas under their national jurisdiction will not
be infringed upon by this treaty, 176 and this new treaty will coexist
with customary international law and apply to states regardless of
their treaty commitments. 177 However, the key topics yet to be
finalized include the treatment of MGRs, the institutional structure
of area-based management tools, the mechanisms for EIAs, and the
degree to which capacity-building and the transfer of marine
technology will take place. Yet, to a certain degree, these issues
hinge on the decision regarding the overarching principle that will
describe the biological resources found in ABNJ. Whether
longstanding ideological issues or a failure to compromise will mar
172 Leary, supra note 65, at 24 (quoting Preparatory Comm. Established by G.A. Res.
69/292: Development of an International Legally Binding Instrument under the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine
Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, Comments by Norway, at 6
(Dec. 2016), http://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/rolling_comp/
Norway.pdf [https://perma.cc/45KM-B8AT].
173 Tiller et al., supra note 63, at 239.
174 See id.
175 Letter from the President of the General Assembly, supra note 68; see President
of the Intergovernmental Conference, Letter dated Sept. 10, 2020 from the President of the
Intergovernmental Conference to Permanent Representatives of Member States to the
United Nations, Members of the specialized agencies, and Parties to the UNCLOS (Sept.
10, 2020), https://www.un.org/bbnj/sites/www.un.org.bbnj/files/intersessional_work__bbnj_president_letter_to_delegations.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE7S-Z9ZK] (“[T]he earliest
possible available date that the fourth session of the Conference can be held is in 2021.”).
176 Leary, supra note 65, at 22.
177 Young & Friedman, supra note 3, at 126.
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the final session is yet to be seen.
Despite grim environmental outlooks and controversial topics,
the overall atmosphere of the BBNJ Conference’s negotiations has
been friendly. 178 The optimism of creating a BBNJ governance
framework is characterized well by the statement of Rena Lee,
Ambassador for Oceans and Law of the Sea Issues, Special Envoy
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore, and President of
the BBNJ intergovernmental conference: “Individually, it will be
challenging to bring about the necessary transformative change that
the areas beyond national jurisdiction need, if we are to conserve
and sustainably use its biodiversity. But together, there is so much
that we can achieve.” 179 The UNCLOS describes ABNJ, and
therefore the biodiversity within them, as property of humanity so
that no single nation can claim ownership of these areas or their
resources. 180 If that statement is going to be respected, any additions
to the UNCLOS will need to facilitate the participation of
developing countries, prioritize sustainability, and protect
biodiversity.
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